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MORTIMER N. S. SELLERS*

The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States
of America
American conceptions of precedent developed and are best understood in the context of the American common law tradition in which
they have played such an important part since the first English settlement of America in the early seventeenth century.' The doctrines
of respect for judicial precedent and fundamental human rights were
two central pillars of the common law, as it was understood in North
America at the time of the Revolution. 2 The newly independent
states conceived of themselves as protecting English common-law
rights against British oppression, and the primal importance of independent judges, judicial precedents and fundamental human rights
has remained central to the self-perceptions of the American legal
profession ever since. 3 This does not mean that American theories of
precedent were then or ever have been well worked-out in practice. 4
Old common-law attitudes toward precedent are so deeply ingrained
in the behavior of American lawyers and judges that they hardly rise
to the conscious level. This can produce a certain confusion, when
judges try to explain the principles behind their decisions, but there
has been a remarkable consistency in practice, maintained by attitudes passed from generation to generation within the American legal profession. 5
* I would like to thank Patricia Behles, Joanne Dugan, James Gernert, Barbara
Jones, Harvey Morrell, Robert Pool, and Elizabeth Rhodes for the help and advice
that they gave me in preparing this article.
1. Thomas R. Lee, "Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding
Era to the Rehnquist Court" in 52 VANDERBILT L. REV. 647 (1999).
2. See James R. Stoner, Jr., Common-Law Liberty: Rethinking American Constitutionality, Lawrence, Kansas, 2003.
3. E.g., Robert A. Sprecher, "The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied," 31 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION J. 501
(1945).
4. Well-known judges who have attempted to make sense of American standards
of precedent include: Lewis F. Powell, Jr., "Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint," 47
WASHINGTON AND LEE L. REV. 281 (1990); Antonin Scalia, "The Rule of Law and the
Law of Rules," 56 U. CHIc. L. REV. 1175 (1989); John Paul Stevens, "The Life-Span of
a Judge-Made Rule," 58 N.Y. UNiv. L. REv. 1 (1983); William 0. Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949).

5. For good descriptions of the actual practices of American judges in using precedent, see Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946-1992 (Cambridge, 1995); Robert S. Summers,
"Precedent in the United States (New York State)," in D. Neil MacCormick and Rob-
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The lack of any detailed theoretical understanding of precedent
has not prevented American judges and lawyers from evangelizing
precedent to their colleagues around the world. In fact, many American lawyers see the practical, untheoretical, common-sense elaboration of the law by judges, through precedent, as one of their system's
primary virtues.6 The clarification of the law through cases can also
make abstract constitutions and the legislature's formal statutes
more useful to citizens, by making the law more certain and more
predictable. Understood in this way, as it is by most judges and lawyers, the concept of precedent in the United States is simply the recognition that judicial decisions have the force of law and must be
respected, not only by the litigants in particular cases, but also by the
government, the public, lawyers and (in most cases) by the courts
themselves. The courts usually respect their own internal lines of
authority, so that the United States Supreme Court has the ultimate
word in federal and constitutional cases, followed by the United
States Court of Appeals, followed by the United States District
Courts, and so forth. Each state's own courts have a similar hierarchy, culminating in a single high court, whose precedents are followed by all the subordinate tribunals.7
The essence of the American system of precedent as experienced
in practice resides in the great authority and hierarchical arrangement of the courts. Common-law customs, state and federal constitutions, and the enactments of legislatures all establish broad
principles and general rules that are worked out in detail by courts in
deciding actual cases and controversies brought by litigants whose
real interests are at stake. Judges try to decide these cases on the
narrowest possible grounds. This makes it easier to distinguish subsequent cases, which may require different results.8 The practice of
precedent may differ slightly as applied to (1) the common law, 9 (2)
constitutions,10 and (3) legislation," which will be examined sepaert S. Summers, Interpreting Precedents:A Comparative Study (Aldershot, England,
1997) at p. 355ff.
6. Frederick Schauer, "Precedent," 39 STANFORD L. REV. 571 (1987).
7. For the views of a United States District Court judge, explaining and advocating this American approach to precedent for a foreign audience, see Peter J. Messitte,
"Common Law v. Civil Law Systems" in Issues of Democracy, September, 1999.
8. Ibid. This is the canonical view.
9. See, e.g., Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921); Karl
Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America (1933), Paul Gewirtz. ed., Trans. Michael
Ansaldi (Chicago, 1989).
10. Michael J. Gerhardt, "The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory," 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV 68 (1991); Charles J. Cooper, "Stare Decisis:
Precedents and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication," 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401
(1988); Henry Paul Monaghan, "Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication," 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988).

11. William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Overruling Statutory Precedents," 76 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 1361 (1988); Amy Coney Barrett, "Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals," 73 GEo. WASH. L. REV. (2005).
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rately below, but all depend ultimately on the culture of American
lawyers, as developed in the course of their separation from Britain,
mostly in the eighteenth century, and perpetuated by the tenacity
and conservatism of the Courts.
I.

THE COMMON LAW

From the very beginning of English settlement in North
America, the British monarchs encouraged emigration by guaranteeing colonists the same liberties, franchises, and immunities that they
would have enjoyed had they remained in England. 12 This commitment slowly dissipated in the practice of the British government during the colonial period, but it remained important to Americans,
whose claims to common-law rights provided the rationale that justified their growing antagonism towards their colonial masters.1 3
When they finally declared their independence from Britain, Americans justified their decision in part as a defense of "the free System of
English Laws,"1 4 so that when the newly independent states established their written constitutions, they were quick to reaffirm the
common law of England, as it existed at the time of their separation
from Britain.15
English and American conceptions of the common law were diverging already before their separation in 1776, as Americans tried to
use law and precedent to constrain governmental power, and British
officials denied their pretensions. Americans embraced the arguments of England's seventeenth-century judges and lawyers against
the crown, while British officials echoed the arguments of their increasingly authoritarian monarchs. Thus Americans preserved an
earlier conception of the common law, as articulated most eloquently
by Sir Edward Coke in his Institutes of the Laws of England (16281644), and the English drifted gradually towards the attitudes of
Thomas Hobbes, as expressed in his Leviathan (1651), and propagated by his disciple Jeremy Bentham, who believed that law is a
12. The Charterof Virginia, April 10, 1606 at XV.
13. E.g., Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of Colonies Examined (Providence, 1764),
reprinted in Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, American Political Writing
During the FoundingEra (Indianapolis, 1983) at 1.46-47.
14. The Declarationof Independence, Action of the Second Continental Congress,
July 4, 1776.
15. See, e.g., A Declarationof Rights, and Constitution and Form of Government
agreed to by the Delegates of Maryland, November 11, 1776 at III: "That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury,
according to that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed at
the time of the first emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable
to their local and other circumstances, and of such others as have been since made in
England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the
courts of law or equity. . . ."
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"command . .. addressed to one formerly obliged to obey." 16 The British command theory pushed English common law towards viewing
precedent as a form of judicial legislation, while American judges continued to feel themselves constrained to discover and respect the common law through reason and judicial precedent, rather than to make
it themselves.1 7
This is not to say either that mutual influence between England
and the United States ended with the Revolution, or that Americans
frequently discussed or even remembered the sources of their somewhat different conception of precedent in the common law, but the
difference remains. Sir Edward Coke had praised the common law as
having been "by the wisdom of the most excellent men, in many successions of ages, by long and continual experience (the trial of right
and truth) fined and refined."' 8 Coke viewed law as the "artificial
perfection of Reason," understood by generations of judges through
long study and experience, and not created by any particular individual, because "no man [is] .

.

. wiser than the Law."1 9 Thomas Jeffer-

son echoed widespread American attitudes when he said of Edward
Coke that "a sounder whig never wrote, nor of profounder learning in
the orthodox doctrines of the British constitution, or in what were
called English liberties." 2 0 Later William Blackstone also came to
have a strong influence on American law and legal education, a development which Jefferson deplored, 2 1 but even Blackstone understood
precedent as Coke had, rooted in the reason and experience of England's judicial tradition.
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England collected and elaborated his lectures as the first Vinerian Professor of
English law at Oxford University. Published in four volumes between 1765 and 1769, Blackstone's Commentaries knew enough
about incipient American rebellion to attack and deny its premisses.
Admitting that "law is the birthright of every subject, so wherever
they go they carry their law with them," Blackstone viewed the
American plantations as "conquered or ceded countries," so that the
common law of England "has no allowance or authority there."2 2 Despite his fundamental disagreement with colonial attitudes on this
16. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London, 1651) at 26-137. Bentham's adoption of this view can be seen, for example, in his A Fragmenton Government (London,
1776) at 1.12.11.
17. For Hobbes and the emergence of this "positivist conception of precedent," see
Gerald J. Postema, "Some Roots of our Notion of Precedent" in Laurence Goldstein,
ed., Precedent in Law (Oxford, 1987), p. 11.
18. Calvin's Case (1608) in Coke's Reports, volume 7, page 31.
19. Coke, Institutes, I, sec. 138 (Frankalmoin, part 5).
20. Thomas Jefferson, letter to James Madison, Monticello, February 17, 1826, in
Thomas Jefferson, Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, Washington, 1984, p. 1513.
21. Ibid., pp. 1513-1514.
22. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, book I, p. 105
(Oxford, 1765).
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point, which was ultimately settled by war, Americans found Blackstone's well-organized description of the common law extremely useful in developing their own new institutions. James Wilson, signer of
both the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution (of which he was a principal draftsman), chief author of Pennsylvania's constitution, and one of the original justices of the United
States Supreme Court, explained Blackstone's influence on American
law well in his own Lectures on Law, which summarized the state of
legal institutions in the new republic. Although not "a zealous friend
of republicanism," 2 3 Blackstone was "clear and methodical," and worthy of consultation (except on questions of public law). 2 4
Blackstone described judicial decisions as the "principal and
most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of
such custom as shall form part of the common law."2 5 Common law
judges had made it their rule to abide by former precedents, he explained, "to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to
waiver with every new judge's opinion." 26 This was because judges
were sworn to determine cases, "not according to their private judgment," but "according to the known laws and customs of the land."
Blackstone admitted one exception, "where the former determination
is most evidently contrary to reason." 27 But even in such cases "the
subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate
the old one from misrepresentation." 28 So the attitude that Americans derived from Blackstone was "that precedents and rules must be
followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust."2 9
Coke and Blackstone bequeathed to American common-law
judges the general presumption that law is the perfection of reason
through experience, so that whatever is not reasonable, cannot be the
law. 3 0 This has had a lasting effect on American jurisprudence,
which expected from the beginning that the common law would
change with time, applying itself differently to different circumstances. James Wilson explained in his lectures that it is "characteristic of a system of common law, that it be accommodated to the
circumstances, the exigencies, and the conveniences of the people," so
that through gradual and successive alterations, it remains materi23. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, ed. Bird Wilson (Philadelphia, 1804), reprinted in Robert G. McCloskey, ed., The Works of James Wilson (Cambridge, Mass.,
1967) at 1.79.
24. Ibid., p. 80. To the extent that Blackstone embraced the Hobbesian theory of
law as a "rule of action prescribed by some superior .. . which the inferior is bound to
obey," Wilson rejected him entirely. Ibid., p. 103.
25. Blackstone, Commentaries, 1.69.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 1.70.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.

72

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 54

ally and substantially the same, at least in its fundamental principles. Like the ship of the Argonauts, the common law retained its
shape, Wilson explained, "though almost every part of her materials
had altered during the course of her voyage."'
This older American attitude, insisting on the sanctity of precedents in general as embodiments of reason and experience, but avoiding too rigid a doctrine of stare decisis in particular cases, persisted
through the nineteenth century, even as British common law became
increasingly rigid and formalistic, under the influence of Jeremy Bentham and his disciples. 3 2 Chancellor James Kent's Commentaries on
American Law, even in the late twelfth edition, edited by Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1873, referred to many "hasty and crude decisions,"
which "ought to be examined without fear, and revised without reluctance, rather than to have the character of the law impaired, and the
beauty and harmony of the system destroyed by the perpetuity of error." Kent added that not even a long series of congruent decisions
should always be viewed as conclusive evidence of what is law. 3 3
Remembering the early history of the American common law has
been necessary, because its application has become so automatic and
unreflective in the modern era that it goes almost entirely unexplained, even in the cases that apply it. Kent summarized the consensus that: (1) the best evidence of the common law is found in the
decisions of the courts; 34 (2) adjudged cases become precedents for
future cases resting on analogous facts;3 5 (3) judges are bound to follow these decisions, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood; 3 6 because (4) the community has a right to regulate their
actions and contracts by law;3 7 so that, (5) "when a rule has been
deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless by a court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except for very cogent reasons, and upon clear manifestation of error."3 8
Kent insisted that the reasoning of the judges in precedent cases is
relevant only to the extent that it is strictly necessary to decide the
questions at hand.3 9
31. James Wilson, Lectures on Law (Philadelphia, 1804) in Robert G. McCloskey,
ed., The Works of James Wilson, volume I, p. 353 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). See Sir
Matthew Hale, A History of the Common Law of England (London, 1713) 3d ed. C.M.
Gray (Chicago, 1971) p. 40 for the probable source of this analogy.
32. See Jim Evans, "Change in the Doctrine of Precedent During the Nineteenth
Century" in Laurence Goldstein, ed., Precedent in Law (Oxford, 1987) for the influence of Bentham and John Austin on English common law.
33. James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, volume I, p. 477 (New York,
1826), twelfth edition, edited by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Boston, 1873).
34. Ibid., p. 473.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 475.
37. Ibid., p. 476.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 477.
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Expressions of the courts that "go beyond the case" are known as
"dicta" and carry less precedential weight. United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Marshall explained the usual common-law
view that dicta "may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision."40 This lesser deference towards dicta may sometimes
embolden lower courts to disregard the general doctrinal statements
of high court judges, who will not feel bound by their own most
sweeping or philosophical pronouncements. Marshall considered the
reason for this maxim to be obvious: "[t]he question actually before
the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.
Other principles, which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in
their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on other
cases is seldom completely investigated." 4 1 Dicta usually provide a
useful guide to the future opinions of the Court, without carrying the
precedential authority of the central holding in the case.
The common law in the different North American states has inevitably diverged somewhat since each first separately received its
own common law from England or from another state, so what the
common law of the states now have most in common is the attitudes
born of their common origin in eighteenth-century American revolutionary ideas. 4 2 American attitudes toward precedent are the attitudes of Coke, Blackstone, Marshall, and Kent, although courts no
longer feel the need to cite these authors, or the decisions on which
they relied. 43 If anything the old connection between precedent and
reason has become more pronounced. For example, the highest court
in Maryland recently negated the old common-law interspousal immunity doctrine, which enjoyed considerable antiquity in England, as
well as in Maryland itself." The court reasoned that "the interspousal immunity doctrine is an antiquated rule of law which
40. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821).
41. Ibid.

42. Justice Harlan explained that "our ancestors brought with them the principles of the common law and claimed it as their birthright" but "adopted only that
portion which was applicable to their situation." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375, 386 (1970), quoting Justice Story in Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 144
(1829), with numerous citations.
43. Sometimes courts go into a certain amount of detail, e.g., Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 402, 388 A.2d 709, 718: "The common
law consists of those principles, maxims, usages and rules of action which observation
and experience of the nature of man, the constitution of society, and the affairs of life
have commended to enlighten reason as best calculated for the government and security of persons and property. Its principles are developed by judicial decisions as necessities arise from time to time demanding the application of those principles to
particular cases in the administration ofjustice." citing People v. Randolph, 2 Parker
Cr. R. 174, 176 (New York, 1855) with numerous citations.
44. Bozman v. Bozman, Court of Appeals of Maryland, 376 Md. 461 (Sept. Term
2002).

74

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[V01. 54

runs counter to prevailing social norms and, therefore, has lived out
its usefulness." 45
The measure of "usefulness" in testing the value of precedents
allows the abrogation of precedents which no longer make practical
sense. For example, the doctrine of interspousal immunity originated
in the concept of coverture, which presumed a legal identity between
husband and wife. 4 6 Coverture itself ended in Maryland with the
Married Women's Act of 1898,47 but not the mutual immunity
against interspousal lawsuits. Despite numerous cases reiterating
the rule of interspousal immunity, 48 the Court of Appeals of Maryland eventually decided that preventing husbands from suing their
wives (and vice versa) served "no sound public policy,"4 9 and was "unsound in the circumstances of modern life."5 0 Exaggerating the inflexibility of stare decisis would "mandate the mockery of reality and
the cultural lag of unfairness and injustice"5 ' and since some old
rules of common law are simply "no longer suitable to our people," 52
the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided to join "the many of our
sister States that have already done so" and "abrogate the interspousal immunity rule, a vestige of the past, whose time has come
and gone."53
The decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in abrogating
the spousal immunity rule illustrates both the persistence and the
flexibility of American doctrines of precedent. Every one of the descriptive phrases used to disparage the abrogated rule (as quoted in
the paragraph above) was repeated from another earlier case. The
Court made a complete review, not only of all the relevant cases in
Maryland, but also of related cases in other American jurisdictions. 5 4
The Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed the history of the doctrine,
its rationale, its impact and effect on women's rights, the views of
legal scholars and of the academic community,5 5 the opinion of distinguished United States Supreme Court justices,5 6 and the position
taken by the Second Restatement of Torts.5 7 The Maryland Court
quoted the Second Restatement of Torts at length, including its rationale for rejecting a rule which was (as the Restatement admitted) "for
45. Ibid., pp. 467-468.
46. Ibid., p. 469.
47. Ibid., p. 471.
48. Ibid., p. 472.
49. Ibid., p. 477, citing Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88.
50. Ibid., p. 478, citing Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521.
51. Ibid., p. 483, citing Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224 at 228.
52. Ibid. at 494, citing Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 274, 462 A.2d at 521-522 and
Harrison v. Montgomery County, 295 Md. at 459, 456 A.2d at 903.
53. Ibid., p. 497.
54. Ibid. at 474-488.
55. All these listed in Ibid. at 479.
56. Ibid. at pp. 476-477.
57. Ibid., p. 484.
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a long time the universal rule in English and American courts."5 8
The Restatement itself followed (and quoted) the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan of the United States Supreme Court, who was
construing a District of Columbia statute.5 9
When the Maryland Court of Appeals abrogated the spousal immunity rule it did so prospectively, for "all causes of action accruing
after the date of the filing of this opinion."6 0 This might seem to contradict the usual view that overturned precedents were "mistaken"
and therefore never the law, but in fact "prospective" overruling developed to protect the reliance interests that help to make precedent
so important and valuable.6 1 Justice Benjamin Cardozo was the
most famous and influential proponent of this practice, which he promoted in his 1921 Storrs Lecture on "The Nature of the Judicial Process."6 2 Cardozo later held for the Supreme Court of the United
States that when a state decides to limit its adherence to precedent,
it "may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward."6 3 When common law courts, as
in Maryland, overturn precedents rendered "no longer suitable" by
time,6 4 it makes sense to do so prospectively, so as to disturb as little
as possible the settled expectations of those who have relied upon the
(obsolescent) law.
The Maryland Court of Appeals' use of the Restatement and the
views of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting Maryland
law, illustrates the extent to which high courts, with the authority to
abrogate their own previous holdings, feel a clear responsibility to do
so only when the law ceases to be "sound" or "useful," and even then
still always buttress their holdings with extensive external authority,
which tends to follow the consensus of their profession, as reflected in
the opinions of the American Law Institute and of prominent judges.
The culture of American judges constrains them to respect higher authority, whenever such authority exists, and to seek persuasive authority, even when they sit on the highest court in their
jurisdiction.6 5 Courts tend to chip away at old doctrine, before rejecting it entirely, so that even the Bozman case overturning spousal
58. Restatement Torts 2d, Section 895F. Husband and Wife, quoted in Bozman at

484.

59. Thompson v. Thompson (1910), 218 U.S. 611, 31 S.Ct. 111.
60. Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 497 (2003).
61. For a useful description of the history of and rationale for the practice of "prospective" overruling, see Walter V. Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques
of Prospective Overruling (New York, 1967).
62. Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), pp. 146-149.
63. Great Northern Railroad Company v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Company,
287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
64. Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 495 (2003).
65. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, "The Rule of Law and the Law of Rules," 56 U. CHic.
L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989), for the "shield" that prior decisions give judges against
those who disapprove their opinions.

76

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 54

immunity could cite older Maryland cases which had criticized the
interspousal immunity rule, without yet entirely destroying it.66
The Restatements of law, published by the American Law Institute, have had a considerable influence over the development of the
common law. Created in 1923 "to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs," 6 7 the
American Law Institute is made up of prominent judges and lawyers,
but the Restatements are the work primarily of law professors, who
are charged with presenting "an orderly statement of the common
law of the United States."6 8 The feeling in the legal profession when
its leaders first launched the Restatement project was that the large
number of decisions of the courts, and the numerous instances in
which the decisions were irrenconcible, "taken in connection with the
growing complication of economic life," was so productive of uncertainty and lack of clarity, that the common law would have had to
give way to a "rigid legislative code," unless the profession could provide some authoritative restatement to promote certainty and clarity
in the courts.6 9
The handbook for American Law Institute reporters stresses the
extent to which Restatements purport to speak for the Institute as a
whole and to represent the "informed consensus" of practitioners,
judges and scholars. 70 "Restatements are addressed to courts and
others applying existing law." They presume to describe the law "as
it is"7 1 - or rather they "assume the stance of describing the law as it
is," which is not exactly the same thing as actually doing so. 72 The
Restatements aim not only to "recapitulate the law as it presently exists," but also to "reformulate it, thereby rendering it clearer and
more coherent while subtly transforming it in the process."7 3 The Restatements, like common-law judges, assume the existence of a body
of shared doctrine "enabling courts to render their judgments in a
consistent and reasonably predictable manner."74 The Restatement
project seeks to "restore the unity of the common law as properly
apprehended."7 5
The Restatements have had a tremendous influence on commonlaw judges, both in encouraging the coherence and consistency of
66. E.g., Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 273, 462 A.2d 506, 521 (1983), cited in
Bozman at 486.
67. Certificate of Incorporation, American Law Institute, February 23, 1923.
68. See, e.g., William Draper Lewis, Introduction to the Restatement of the Law of
Trusts, June 13, 1935.
69. Ibid. at pp. viii-ix.
70. Capturing the Voice of the American Law Institute: A Handbook for ALI Reporters and Those Who Review Their Work (Philadelphia, 2005) p. 2.
71. Ibid. p. 3.
72. Ibid. p. 4.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., p. 5.

20061

DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT

77

their doctrine, and in encouraging uniformity between the otherwise
entirely separate state jurisdictions across the North American continent. The Restatement assumes the perspective of a common-law
court, "attentive to and respectful of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is inappropriate or inconsistent with the law as a
whole."76 Viewed in another way, the Restatements resemble codifications, while purposely avoiding the statutory form, to preserve the
flexibility which is characteristic of the common law.7 7 The Restatements seek to anticipate the direction in which the law is "tending"
and to assist this development by building on previously established
principles. 78 In effect, the Restatements often promote changes in the
law "which make the law better adapted to the needs of life." 7 9
The tremendous influence of the Restatements in promoting the
harmonization of American law is matched and reinforced by the influence of the United States Supreme Court. The same Maryland
case used above to illustrate the most recent practices of common-law
courts, turned directly from the Restatement of Torts to the practice of
other states (while making it clear that "the decisions of our sister
jurisdictions are not binding on this Court and ought not dictate the
course of jurisprudence in the State of Maryland."). 8 0 But when it
came to discussing the rules of precedent that would apply in the
case, which is to say, the underlying precedents governing the application of precedent in Maryland, the Maryland Court of Appeals
turned almost entirely to United States Supreme Court cases, and
specifically the Supreme Court's decisions in Planned Parenthoodv.
Casey (1992), which refused to overturn a precedent protecting abortion,8 1 and Payne v. Tennessee (1991),82 which rejected precedents
forbidding "victim impact" statements at the sentencing phase of
trial.
The struggles in the United States Supreme Court over questions of precedent have been so public and so prolonged, that they
have shaped the attitudes of lawyers and judges throughout the
American federation, despite the court's lack of authority over the
common law in the states. The Maryland Court of Appeals cited
Casey for the proposition that "stare decisis is not an inexorable command."8 3 The relevant passage in Payne v. Tennessee was quoted in
full and bears repetition here. "Stare decisis is the preferred course,
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable and consistent de76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 6.
Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 490.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609.
Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 493 (2003).
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velopment of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions,
and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process. Adhering to precedent is usually the wise policy, because in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than it be settled right. Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court has never felt
constrained to follow precedent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command; rather it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision."8 4
This state court policy of citing United States Supreme Court decisions to explain the states' own common-law interpretation of precedents illustrates the strong desire for a continental harmonization of
law that exists between the states, and the great prestige of the
United States Supreme Court, even when it does not have jurisdiction. The Maryland Court of Appeals was typical in turning, first to
its own decisions (which it overturned, but showed to have been tending towards abrogation for many years),8 5 then to the persuasive example of other states (many of which had already abrogated the
doctrine),8 6 then to the views of scholars (who condemned the doctrine),8 7 then to the Restatement8 8 and finally to the United States
Supreme Court.8 9 The example of the United States Supreme Court
was particularly important in explaining the doctrine of precedent,
and the Maryland Court of Appeals cited the example of Brown v.
Board of Education, the federal case which nullified racial segregation in the schools, to show that the disgraceful practice of racial separation would have remained legal were it not for the Court's power
to overturn its own previous decisions, when they proved to be
"clearly wrong."90
II.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

The Constitution of the United States of America establishes the
United States Supreme Court at the pinnacle of the system of federal
tribunals.9 1 The Supreme Court must therefore frequently examine
its own precedents, and explain their continued validity. 92 The stud84. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-8, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609. Citations to
other cases omitted. They are discussed below in the section on the United States
Constitution.
85. Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 465-475.
86. Ibid. at 476-477, 481-483, 487-488.
87. Ibid. at 479.
88. Ibid. at 484.
89. Ibid. at 493-494.
90. Ibid. at 494, citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
91. Constitution of the United States of America (1787), Art. III: "The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
92. On the use of precedent by the United States Supreme Court, see Michael J.
Gerhardt, "The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory," 60
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ied terseness of the United States Constitution, and the great importance of the fundamental rights that it protects, has produced several
Supreme Court decisions that excite public controversy, and rest on
heavily disputed interpretations of ambiguous clauses of the founding document. Prominent among these is the case of Roe v. Wade
(1973), which discovered a woman's right to abortion in the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution and invalidated state
laws that restrict that right.9 3 The possibility that the Court might
overturn Roe has provoked strong interest ever since in the nature
and effect of Supreme Court precedent. The Court had an opportunity to overturn Roe in the case of Casey v. Planned Parenthood of
Pennsylvania, but declined to do so. 94
The Supreme Court's decision in Casey provides a good example
of a case in which the Court considered itself bound by precedent to
make a decision that might well have turned out differently in a case
of first impression. Casey concerned fundamental rights, derived ultimately from Magna Carta and the old common-law protections preserved by the Constitution.9 5 These therefore required the same
application of "reasoned judgment" that is expected of common-law
courts.9 6 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter relied on the academic reflections of well-known judges (Benjamin Cardozo and Lewis
F. Powell) to set out a framework for their discussion of the use of
precedent by the United States Supreme Court.9 7 They described the
use of precedent as "prudential" and "pragmatic," depending upon: (1)
the rule of law ideal; (2) the workability of the old rule; (3) the hardship caused by upsetting reliance on prior decisions; (4) the extent to
which subsequent decisions have undermined old precedents; and (5)
whether facts have changed in the interim.98
The two key factors in Casey turned out to be the reliance of society on old cases protecting abortion 9 9 and the damage that the rule of
law ideal would suffer in overturning such a famous and controversial precedent.10 0 Many previous Supreme Court cases had recogGEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991); Charles J. Cooper, "Stare Decisis: Precedents and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication," 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1988); Henry Paul
Monaghan, "Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication," 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723
(1988). For an empirical study, see Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946-1992 (Cambridge,
1995).
93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania,505 U.S. 833 (1992).
95. Ibid. at 847.
96. Ibid. at 849.
97. Ibid. at 854, citing Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process (1921)
and Lewis F. Powell "Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint" 1991 The Journal of Supreme Court History 13 (1991).
98. Casey at 854-855.
99. Ibid. at 855-856.
100. Ibid. at 864-867.
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nized the importance of reliance on legal precedents in a commercial
context. 0 1 The Casey opinion insisted that reliance could be equally
important in "intimate relationships," which have important implications for the "economic and social life of the Nation."10 2 Moreover, to
overrule such a prominent case would seriously undermine the
Court's legitimacy, by calling into question the principled character of
its own variable decisions. 0 3 "Frequent overruling would overtax
the Country's belief in the Court's good faith," particularly when revisiting divisive and controversial cases.10 4
It is important to note that the authors of the Casey opinion reiterated the common wisdom that stare decisis is not an "inexorable
command" 0 5 and provided a list of factors to be taken into account in
overruling precedents that closely followed a similar discussion offered by former Justice Lewis F. Powell, shortly after his retirement.10 6 The dissenters in Casey challenged Powell's concern for
"legitimacy," 0 7 but accepted the importance of reliance, and the
other factors cited by the majority.' 0 8 The difference in the case depended, not on the standards to be applied, but on their application to
a particular set of facts. Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that Roe
was wrongly decided, and should have been overruled.' 0 9 The concept of "reliance," while important, did not extend in his view to the
future abortions of not-yet-existent pregnancies." 0 ,
The Casey opinion referred frequently to the case of Payne v.
Tennessee, which closely preceded it. Payne too had insisted on the
importance of respecting public reliance on established legal precedents,"' the desirability of creating "settled" rules of law,"x2 and the
necessity of overturning "unworkable" or "badly reasoned" precedents."13 Reiterating that stare decisis is not an "inexorable command" or "mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,"
but rather a useful "principle of policy,"11 4 the Supreme Court gave
101. E.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
102. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
103. Ibid. at 865-866.
104. Ibid. at 866-867.
105. Ibid. at 854, citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-411
(Brandeis dissenting) and Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (Souter concurring).
106. Lewis F. Powell, "Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint," 1991 Supreme Court
Journal 13 (1991).
107. Casey at 958.
108. Ibid. at 956.
109. Ibid. at 944.
110. Ibid. at 956.
111. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991), citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254, 265-266 (1986).
112. Payne v. Tennessee at 827, citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting).
113. Payne v. Tennessee at 827, citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
114. Payne v. Tennessee at 828, citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119
(1940).
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several further guidelines for identifying those cases in which overruling precedents would be appropriate. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained for the Court that constitutional cases should be particularly
susceptible to judicial correction, because in such cases, "correction
through legislative action is practically impossible."l 1 5 Cases involving property and contract rights, on the other hand, deserve special
deference, because of the reliance interests involved.1 1 6
As in the state court decisions overturning common-law precedents, the Supreme Court in Payne felt it necessary to support almost
every sentence in its opinion with citations to previous cases. In addition to parenthetical references to well-known cases (such as those
listed in the previous paragraph), there were footnotes to long lists of
as many as fifty cases, supporting the reasoning of the court. 1 17
Opinions cited were selected for their antiquity (The Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh (1852)) or for the reputation of the judge pronouncing them
(Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.) rather than for necessarily being the most recent decision on point. The 1932 dissent of
Justice Brandeis in the Burnet case has come to be the opinion most
often cited to support the proposition that mistakes in constitutional
cases require judicial correction more often than wrongly interpreted
statutes, which could be revisited by the legislature. Brandeis wrote
in dissent, but his opinion is remembered more than that of the majority. This possibility of persuading future courts and lawyers encourages appellate judges to write careful and reasoned dissents,
when they believe the majority to be mistaken.1 1 8 The Payne case
corrected a decision made just four years earlier in Booth v.
Maryland.119
The two recent opinions overruled by Payne v. Tennessee were
both decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions. Both cases had
been questioned by members of the Court in later opinions.12 0 This
emboldened the Supreme Court of Tennessee to disregard United
States Supreme Court precedents, which the Tennessee Court
115. Payne v. Tennessee at 828, citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, at 407 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting).
116. Payne v. Tennessee at 828, citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 283 U.S. 111, 116
(1965); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363
(1977); Burnet v. CoronadoOil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, at 405-411 (1932) (Brandeis
dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1942); The Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 458, 13 L.Ed. 1058 (1852).
117. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n. 1 (1991).
118. Justice Harlan's dissent against racial segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 557, 562 (1896), was famously vindicated in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
119. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). The Court also reconsidered the
holding of South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
120. This at least is how they were characterized in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 828-829 (1991).
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surmised (correctly) had ceased to represent the Supreme Court's actual understanding of the law. This illustrates an interesting aspect
of constitutional precedent as applied by United States courts.
Subordinate courts may sometimes anticipate changes in the higher
court's understanding of precedent, based on hints in other high court
opinions or discernible trends in the law. Dissents in previous cases
had indicated the Supreme Court's desire to correct "the freshness of
error" before it gained the respect of a long-established practice. 12 1
The Supreme Court of Tennessee responded to the federal court's
hints, by disregarding the mistaken rule. 12 2 This does not contradict
the underlying assumption that Supreme Court precedents "must be
followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the
judges of those courts may [consider them] to be."1 2 3
The Supreme Court of the United States has felt particularly free
to overrule its own constitutional precedents when, as in Payne, they
concern procedural and evidentiary rules rather than property rights
or contracts. 124 This does not, however, mean the Court will do so
readily, without some "special justification" to support a departure
from precedent.125 Dickerson v. United States provides a recent example of a case in which the Court declined to overturn a procedural
rule, the so-called "Miranda"warnings to criminal suspects, because
"Mirandahas become embedded in routine police practice to the
point where the warnings have become part of our national culture."12 6 The Supreme Court is most likely to overturn its precedents
when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings.12 7 This was not the case when Dickerson reaffirmed
Miranda.12 8
In the tradition of common-law courts since the beginning of the
republic, the United States Supreme Court has always been extremely solicitous of personal liberty. The most celebrated recent examples of overruled precedents concern the "liberty" protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. For example, in the case of Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Supreme Court
declared all state laws against consensual "deviate sexual inter121. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia dissenting).
122. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826 (1991), quotes with approval the Supreme Court of Tennessee's statement that the existing rule was "an affront to the
civilized members of the human race."
123. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam).
124. Ibid. at 828.
125. Dickerson v. United States, 430 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000), citing
United States v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856, quoting
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (Souter concurring) and Arizona v. Rumsey, 467
U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
126. Dickerson v. United States, 430 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
127. Ibid. at 2336; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
128. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) (established the right
of criminal subjects to certain warnings before interrogation).

2006]

DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT

83

course" (anal sex) to be unconstitutional, despite earlier cases allowing such prohibitions.1 2 9 The Constitution forbids any state to
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process or
law."13 0 Liberty "protects the person against unwarranted government intrusions ,"131 and the Supreme Court has found some intrusions to be so unwarranted that to tolerate them in any
circumstances would violate the due process of law. 13 2 So although
proscriptions against consensual "sodomy" have ancient roots,133 the
Lawrence Court insisted that "later generations can see that laws
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress."13 4
Lawrence v. Texas gives a striking example of the limits of precedent as applied to liberty (or its denial) by United States courts. "As
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom."' 3 5 The Constitution promises "a realm of personal liberty which the government may
not enter," whatever courts may have said in the past.'3 6 Nevertheless, in overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, the United States Supreme
Court felt compelled to argue that "precedents before and after its
issuance contradict its central holding." 3 7 The Court cited Justice
Stevens' dissent in Bowers to support its conclusion that the Bowers
holding "was not correct when it was decided and it is not correct
today." 3 8 Using the framework for evaluating precedents laid out in
Payne v. Tennessee and Casey, the Court found that there had been
no detrimental reliance, the status quo was unworkable, and subsequent cases had undermined the rationale of the original decision.13 9
Casey upheld precedent. Lawrence overturned precedent. Both extended liberty and this was probably the most important factor in
determining their results.
The Supreme Court's test of the validity and influence of its own
old precedents rests in the end, as in common-law courts, on reason
and experience, applied to the circumstances and exigencies of the
day.14 0 The Court considers whether the foundations of prior deci129. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003), overturned Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986).
130. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1787), Amendment 14.
131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 562 (2003).
132. Ibid. at 564, citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
133. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 567 (2003), citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
192 (1986). The Lawrence Court distinguished modern states frm the older ones, because of their boarder reach. Lawrence at 570.
134. Ibid. at 579.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid. at 578.
137. Ibid. at 577.
138. Ibid. at 578.
139. Ibid. at 577.
140. Cf. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, ed. Bird Wilson (Philadelphia, 1804), in
Robert McCloskey, ed., The Works of James Wilson, vol. 1, p. 353 (Cambridge, Mass.,
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sions have been "eroded" by subsequent cases, whether precedents
have been subject to "substantial and continuing" criticism, and
whether there has been "individual or societal reliance" on past holdings, 14 1 but must recognize in the end (particularly with regard to
protected fundamental liberties) that "history and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point" of necessary judicial deliberation.' 4 2
The Supreme Court of the United States begins its deliberations
in every constitutional case with the text of the United States Constitution, but then, like common-law courts, must turn to "history and
tradition" to give that text meaning.14 3 In the Lawrence case, this
included (in the order in which they were raised) previous Supreme
Court cases, 144 the holdings of the State courts,145 the suggestions of
the American Law Institute, 1 46 and the example of the European
Court of Human Rights.14 7 This final authority (an attempt to put
American practices into the context of "Western Civilization") excited
some criticism in a dissent as not being "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"14 8 but many other cases show that
American courts have always referred to foreign decisions, treaties
and legislation as evidence of what reason requires as applied to
American law.14 9
III.

STATUTES AND PRECEDENT

Statutes require interpretation by courts, just as constitutions
and the common law do, but they differ from constitutions in that
legislatures can revise them, and from the common law in reflecting
1967). See also Craig Evan Klafter, Reason Over Precedent:Origins of American Legal Thought (Westport, Connecticut, 1993).
141. Justice Scalia accurately summarized the standard established by Lawrence
in his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003).
142. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas at 572, citing his
own concurring opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998).
Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence agrees that even liberty interests unsupported by
history and tradition deserve "heightened scrutiny" to determine whether laws that
restrict them are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Ibid. at 593, note 3.
143. Cf. Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence at 593.
144. Lawrence v. Texas at 564.
145. Ibid. at 571.
146. Ibid. at 572.
147. Ibid. at 573.
148. Ibid. (Scalia dissent) at 598.
149. See, for example, the recent case of Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005),
which mentioned the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (never
ratified by the United States) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (to which the United States had made significant reservations). The majority
opinion in Roper v. Simmons gives several examples of previous Supreme Court citations to foreign law (ibid. at 1199) as does the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor
(ibid. at 1215-1216): "Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency." (with citations).
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the legislature's will. This raises questions of deference that are absent in other precedents.1 5 0 Justice Brandeis introduced the oftenrepeated idea that precedents deserve the most deference when legislatures have the opportunity to correct them.1 5 ' According to this
reasoning, the Court should overrule its erroneous constitutional decisions more readily, because "legislative action is practically impossible," but leave its own erroneous interpretations of statutes in
place, so long as the legislature continues (tacitly) to approve
them.152 The Supreme Court has suggested that: "Considerations of
stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation," because "the legislative power is implicated" in the Court's
decision. 153
The Supreme Court of the United States suggested in 1989 that
statutory precedents should only be overruled when there has been:
(1) intervening development in the law, weakening the conceptual
underpinnings of the decision; (2) later law has rendered the decision
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines; (3) the precedent has
become a positive detriment, because of inherent confusion created
by an unworkable decision; or (4) having been "tested by experience,
has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with
social welfare." 154 This list differs very little from the considerations
taken into account in overruling constitutional precedents, and it
now seems in retrospect that Justice Brandeis hoped to introduce a
more relaxed standard for constitutional precedents, rather than a
stricter precedential standard for statutes. 5 5 In practice this seems
to be a distinction without a difference and the Court has recognized
that it is "impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional ap56
proval of the Court's statutory interpretation."
Despite occasional efforts to draw fine distinctions, the rules of
precedent applied throughout the United States in common law, stat150. Recent scholarship disparages this supposed difference. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Overruling Statutory Precedents," 76 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1361 (1988);
Amy Coney Barrett, "Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeal," 73 GEO. WASHINGTON L. REV. 317 (2005).
151. Burnet v. CoronadoOil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 447 (1932)
(Brandeis dissent).
152. This doctrine was reiterated in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989).
153. Ibid. at 172, citing Square D Co. v. Niagara FrontierTariff Bureau, Inc., 476
U.S. 409, 424, 106 S.Ct. 1922, 1930-1931 (1986); IllinoisBrick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 736, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2069-70 (1977).
154. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-174 (1989), with numerous citations.
155. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-408 (1932): "The Court
bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that
the process of trial and error, is appropriate to the judicial function."
156. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2371 n.
1 (1989).
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utory and constitutional cases seem usually to converge, and to follow
the practice of the United States Supreme Court. It is not uncommon
for cases that must excise unconstitutional elements from statutes,
also to interpret the remaining elements of the statute in the light of
common law and constitutional principles of liberty and due process.15 7 This would make it difficult to decide which standards to apply, were the standards in fact different, but in practice the courts
have not been troubled by this possible inconsistency, since the legislature can still claim the last word, if it wishes to devise new legislation that better respects the Constitution, common-law liberties, or
its own previous intent. 58
IV.

CONCLUSION

The use of precedent by courts in the United States of America
should be viewed as a tradition or a practice, rather than a legal doctrine in the strictest sense of the word, because it is so deeply embedded in the culture of the legal profession and the judiciary that it
takes place without much reflection by judges. In its simplest and
most important sense, the doctrine of stare decisis requires all tribunals of inferior jurisdiction to follow the precedents of courts of superior jurisdiction, to accept the law as declared by superior courts, and
not to attempt to overrule their decisions.' 5 9 American lawyers have
come to believe that "[t]he slightest deviation from this rigid rule
would destroy the sanctity of the judicial practice. There would be no
finality or stability in the law and the court system would be chaotic
in its operation and unstable and inconsistent in its decisions."1 60
This strict rule of stare decisis, which governs lower courts in all
common-law, statutory and constitutional cases, does not clarify the
circumstances in which courts may overrule their own previous decisions, or deviate from their own precedents. Americans have never
wandered very far down the Benthamite road of extreme stare decisis, which once bound English common-law courts to respect their
own erroneous or unreasonable precedents.' 6 ' Perhaps this distinction between English and American practice arose in part from amor157. This seems to be the case in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
158. Ibid. at 768. The dissenters in Booker still criticized the court for embracing
"a policy choice which Congress has considered and decisively rejected." Ibid. at 771.
This problem arose because the Court invalidated a part of the statute as unconstitutional while trying to preserve the rest.
159. The most frequently cited case on this point, which is such a truism that cases
are rare, is Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, decided en
banc by the Supreme Court of California, 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937, 939-940
(1962).
160. State v. Tennessee v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (1995), quoting Barger v.
Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976).
161. For a discussion of the distinction between English and American practices in
1932, see Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 410, 52 S.Ct. 443, 449 (1932)
(Brandeis dissenting), citing London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council
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phousness of the English Constitution, which leaves Parliament free
to correct any perceived errors of the judiciary, 16 2 but the more fundamental difference follows from the American view of law as intimately connected to reason, not a command, but truth as revealed by
experience. "It is more important that the Court should be right upon
later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent
with previous declarations. Those doctrines only will eventually
stand which bear the strictest examination and the test of

experience." 1 6 3
This is not to say that American courts have not accepted that
"very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts
should not lightly overrule past decisions." 164 Justice Harlan listed
the importance of giving the public a "clear guide," the value of helping individuals "to plan their affairs," the benefits of "expeditious adjudication," and "the necessity of maintaining public faith in the
judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgements" as all
strongly indicating that Courts should respect their own precedents.16 5 But none of these purposes would be well-served by "continued adherence to a rule unjustified in reason."' 66 American courts,
steeped as they are in the common-law tradition, do not overturn
precedents lightly, and when they do so, it is always with copious
citations to their own prior cases, to precedents in other American
courts, to the Restatement (if appropriate), to the opinions of scholars,
and to whatever other courts and authorities can be found to support
their interpretation of the law.167
Whether they are interpreting the common law, statutes or constitutions, American judges respect their own precedents as a "principle of policy," rather than an "inexorable command."s6 8 Attitudes
toward precedent have been remarkably stable throughout American
history, with small changes of rhetoric, usually in dissents, depending upon the perceived needs of the day. At the moment, more "lib(1898) A.C. 375 and the discussion of Arthur L. Goodhart, "Case Law in England and
America," 15 CORNELL L.Q. 173, 188, 193.
162. Brandeis's suggestion, Burnet, 285 U.S. 393, 410 (1929).
163. Justice Field in Barden v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 154 U.S. 322, quoted by
Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
410 n.3 (1932).
164. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1789 (1970).
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid. at 405.
167. Most of these sources are "persuasive" rather than "binding" precedent. The
concept of "binding" precedent is only really valid in the American context when following courts of superior authority.
168. These phrases now appear in nearly all cases concerning precedent, usually
attributed to Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991), but they appeared in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Helvering v. Hadlock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940), and in
numerous subsequent cases.
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eral" judges tend to exaggerate the binding force of precedent, 169
while more "conservative" judges tend to disparage the precedents of
earlier "liberal" courts,17 0 but neither view has had much influence
on the traditional consensus that departures from precedent require
some "special justification" to justify the damage to settled expectations they inevitably represent.171
American judges find it easiest to overturn old precedents, when
experience has proved them to be unworkable or a long line of subsequent precedents has gradually undermined their foundations.1 72
They find it hardest to do so when property, contracts, 7 3 or liberty 7 4
is at stake. 7 5 Common-law judges sometimes overrule precedents
prospectively 7 6 but usually not,' 7 7 because overruled precedents
must be viewed as having been "mistaken" or "unreasonable" even
before the high court declared them to be so.' 78 "Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitum," but "reason" lies in the precedents of judges,
"gotten by long study, observation and experience" of an "infinite
number of grave and learned men."1 79

169. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's dissent in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 848
(1991).

170. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's dissents in Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct.
2326, 2346 (2000); Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505

U.S. 833, 982 (1992).
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